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Scislowski: Jenkins v. James B. Day & Co.

JENKINS V. JAMES B. DAY & CO.:
A NEW DEFENSE OF STATE TORT LAW
AGAINST FEDERAL PREEMPTION - IS IT LEGITIMATE?
I. INTRODUCTION

Federalism is allegedly eroding.' Expansive governmental regulation
and vigorous, unprincipled judicial activists are said to be the culprits.2 Prior
to 1986, courts rejected allegations that the ever increasing Federal regulatory
schemes preempted state common law products liability actions.' However,
during the mid-1980s, courts became more willing to entertain preemption
arguments.'
Recently, the Supreme Court of Ohio had occasion to rule on the
issue of whether a federal law containing an express preemption provision
preempted Ohio statutory tort claims predicated on an inadequate warning
label of a consumer product. In the case of Jenkins v. James B. Day & Company,5 the Ohio Supreme Court held that the Federal Hazardous Substances
Act (FHSA) 6 does not preempt a plaintiff's statutory products liability claim
challenging a label on a substance covered by the Act.7 In reaching this conclusion, the court formulated a new argument to defeat the preemption provision of the FHSA; an argument which may be applicable to other federal
enactments with analogous provisions.'
This Note will recount the general law of federal preemption and its
recent developments. 9 Next, it will describe the Jenkins case, the facts leading to the litigation, the prior procedure in the lower courts, and the Ohio
1. Philip H. Corboy & Todd A. Smith, Federal Preemption of Product Liability Law:
Federalism and the Theory of Implied Preemption, 15 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 435, 435 (1992)
("The dramatic expansion of 'implied' preemption by federal appellate courts represents a
major departure from established principles of federalism."); Marc Z. Edell & Cynthia A.
Walters, The Doctrine of Implied Preemption in ProductsLiability Cases - Federalism in the
Balance, 54 TENN. L. REV. 603, 603 (1987) (describing the results of a 1986 report entitled
The Status of Federalism in America: A Report of the Working Group on Federalism of the
Domestic Policy Council).
2. Edell & Walters, supra note 1, at 603.

3.Id. at 613-14.
4. See id. at 618.
5. 634 N.E.2d 998 (Ohio 1994).
6. The Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1277 (1988).
7. Jenkins, 634 N.E.2d at 1003.
8. This Note groups the Federal Hazardous Substances Act with the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act and the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. See
infra note 42 for a more detailed explanation of the similarities between the preemption
provisions of these acts.
9. See infra part II. A.
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Supreme Court's reasoning in the opinion.' I Lastly, this Note will critically
evaluate the court's new argument supporting the preservation of state tort
claims in light of familiar principles of statutory construction."
II. BACKGROUND

A. The General Law of FederalPreemption
The general scheme of the law of preemption is well settled.

2

Most

courts considering the issue first outline a set of principles that are more or
less constant across jurisdictional boundaries. 3
The power of the federal government to supersede state law flows from
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. 4 As preemption
occurs only when Congress actually exercises its power to issue superior
law granted by the Constitution, the key question in every preemption analysis
is whether Congress intended to displace state law by its legislative
enactments. 5
There are two kinds of preemption: express and implied. 6 Where
Congress has explicitly addressed the issue of preemption within the text of
the statute, State law is said to be expressly preempted. 7 Only state law that
actually conflicts with the express scheme of federal regulation is pre10. See infra parts III. A, B, & C.

11. See infra part IV. B.
12. Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604 (1991) ("The ways in which
federal law may preempt state law are well established.").
13. For further discussion of the law of federal preemption with respect to state tort law
claims, see, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, FederalPreemption of State ProductsLiability Doctrines,
44 S.C. L. REV. 187 (1993); Dan D. Kohane & Thomas P. Cunningham, Is One Warning
Enough? Federal Preemptionof Common Law Tort Claims, 44 FED'N OF INS. & CORP. COUNS.
Q. 269 (1994).
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("the Laws of the United States, which shall be made in
Pursuance [of the Constitution] .... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding."); see Joseph T. McLaughlin et al., Federal Preemption, C842
ALI- ABA 639, 641 (1993).
15. Mortier, 501 U.S. at 604; Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n. v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 369
(1986) ("The critical question in any preemption analysis is always whether Congress intended
that Federal [law] supersede state law.").
16. Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1021 (1 1th Cir. 1991); McLaughlin et al., supra
note 14, at 642 ("Preemption may be express or implied."); See also Silkwood v. KerrMcGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) ("[s]tate law can be preempted in either of two
general ways.").
17. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (holding preemption must be
found if Congress' desire to regulate a field is explicit in the statute's language).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol28/iss2/9

2

Scislowski: Jenkins v. James B. Day & Co.

Fall/Winter !1995]

JENKINS V. JAMES B. DAY & Co.

empted.'8
Implied preemption results where Congressional intent to displace state
law, though not express, is nevertheless "clear" '9 or "manifest." 2 0 The unspoken manifestation of Congressional intent may take several forms. 2' First,
Congress may have "occupied the field" by crafting a statutory scheme of
directives "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room for the State to supplement it." 22 Second, state law may be displaced

where it directly conflicts with federal law.23 Such conflict may occur if it is
impossible to simultaneously comply with state and federal laws, 24 or when
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress. 2 5
In cases where a federal statute has an express preemption provision that
does not clearly preempt the particular state law claim wherein the preemption defense was raised, courts have divided over the question of whether
it is appropriate to look further for federal preemption if none is apparent
after an express preemption analysis. 26 Some courts will not conduct an
implied preemption analysis if an express analysis fails. 27 A majority
18. Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1151 (D.N.J. 1984) (holding state
law should be superseded "only to the extent of actual conflict with the scheme of federal
regulation," citing Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 613 (1918)), rev'd, 789 F.2d 181 (3d
Cir. 1986).
19. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("[W]e are to start with the
assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."), rev'd, 331 S. Ct.
247 (1947).
20. Id.
21. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (holding the purpose of Congress to preempt state law "may be
evidenced in several ways"), rev'd, 331 S. Ct. 247 (1947). The opinion proceeds to describe
four methods of implied preemption, which are largely recounted in the infra notes 23-26 and
accompanying text. See also id. at 230; see Edell & Walters, supra note 1 for a general
discussion.
22. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
23. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (holding that state law that conflicts
with federal law is without effect); See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 427
(1819) (holding that state laws conflicting with constitutionally permissible federal laws are
void).
24. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers Inc., v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) ("A
holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into
congressional design where compliance with both federal and state regulation is a physical
impossibility.").
25. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See also Finberg v. Sullivan, 634 F.2d
50, 63 (3d Cir. 1980) (further describing the steps to analyze whether state law interferes
with or hinders the objectives of Congress).
26. See infra notes 27-28.
27. E.g., Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691, 692 (Minn. Ct. App.
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of courts, however, proceed automatically after failing to find express
preemption.2 8
Lastly, in order to safeguard State sovereignty in marginal cases where
it is unclear whether Congress expressly or impliedly intended to wield its
superior authority, the courts have adopted a presumption against preemption. 29 The presumption against preemption may be considered to be heightened when Congress trespasses upon the historic police powers of the State.3"
The common law tort system, which safeguards citizens against unsafe consumer products though the imposition of damage awards upon irresponsible
manufacturers, is a manifestation of the State's police power.3"
B.

Case Treatment of Specific Legislative Acts

Over the past several decades, the Federal government has enacted a
number of provisions affecting State law. In 1947, Congress passed the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).3 2 FIFRA was initially designed to license and label the various pesticides being used in this
country.33 In 1972, it was strengthened to provide a more comprehensive

1988), rev'd, 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989) ("Where Congress has spoken on the subject of
preemption and not explicitly preempted the fundamental right to bring a state tort action, we
find it inappropriate and wholly unnecessary to strain to find implied preemption.").
28. These courts exemplify the tendency to move immediately on to an implied preemption
analysis after failing to find express preemption: See, e.g., Worm v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 970
F.2d 1301, 1305-06 (4th Cir. 1992); Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Assoc., v. Allenby, 958 F.2d
941, 947 (9th Cir. 1992); Lee v. Boyle-Midway Household Products, Inc., 792 F. Supp.
1001, 1007 (W.D. Pa. 1992); Forster v. R.J. Reynolds, 437 N.W.2d 655, 658 (Minn. 1989).
29. CSX Trans., Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1737 (1993) ("In the interest of
avoiding unintentional encroachment on the authority of the States, however, a court
interpreting a federal statute pertaining to a subject traditionally governed by state law will
be reluctant to find preemption.").
30. Forster v. R.J. Reynolds, 423 N.W.2d 691, 696 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988)(holding traditional
presumption against preemption is heightened by four factors, one of them being whether the
federal act allegedly displaces laws relating to the preservation of the health and safety of the
citizens, an historic police power), rev'd, 437 N.W.2d 655 (Minn. 1989).
31. Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1542 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied 469
U.S. 1062 (1984) "The provision of tort remedies to compensate for personal injuries 'is a
subject matter of the kind [the] Court has traditionally regarded as properly within the scope
of state superintendence."' Id. (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 144 (1963)).
32. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 (1947)
(prior to 1972 amendment).
33. McLaughlin et al., supra note 14, at 658. Section 3 of the Act sets forth the labeling
requirements on substances covered by the Act. Section 4 provides that "every economic
poison [i.e., pesticide] which is distributed, sold, or offered for sale [anywhere in the United
States] ...shall be registered with the Secretary [of Agriculture]." ch. 125, §§ 3-4, 61 Stat.
164, 166-67 (1947).
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regulatory scheme of labeling requirements, 34 and more vigorous enforcement
by the Environmental Protection Agency.3 5 In 1960, Congress passed the
FHSA,36 which was designed to "provide nationally uniform requirements for
adequate cautionary labeling" of substances covered by the Act.37 In 1965,
Congress passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (the
Cigarette Act). 3 8 The Cigarette Act prevented a "potential maze of inconsistent state regulations" 3 9 by establishing a strict scheme of warnings to be
placed on all cigarette packages. ° In 1969, these labeling requirements were
41

enhanced.

FIFRA, the FHSA, and the Cigarette Act all contain similar preemption

34. McLaughlin et al., supra note 14, at 658. Section 3(a)(2) of the 1947 version required
that labels on pesticides bear (i) the name and address of the manufacturer, (ii) the name
brand of the toxic substance, (iii) an indication of the net weight of the contents of the package,
(iv) a skull and crossbones, (v) the word "poison" printed in bold red letters, and (vi) a
statement of the antidote. See ch. 125 § 3 (a)(2), 61 Stat. 164, 166 (1947).
In contrast, § 2(q)( I) and (2) of the 1972 version required that labels on pesticides bear (i)
the EPA registration number of the product, (ii) directions for safe use, (iii) a warning adequate
to "protect health and the environment," (iv) a statement of the product's use classification,
(v) the name and address of the manufacturer, (vi) the name brand of the toxic substance,
(vii) the net weight of the contents, (viii) a skull and crossbones, (ix) the word "poison", and
(x) a statement of practical treatment or first-aid. See Pub. L. No. 92-516, §§ 2(a)(1-2), 86
Stat. 973, 977 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988)).
35. Worm v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1305 (1992). Under § 7 of the 1947
version, the Secretary of Agriculture could; (i) issue regulations, (ii) compel inspections of
pesticides, and (iii) issue written warnings of non-compliance. See ch. 125, § 7, 61 Stat. 164,
169-70 (1947).
The Administer of the EPA had a variety of enforcement powers under the 1972 version of
the Act. Under § 9(a), the Administer could inspect the premises of producers. Under §
13(a) the administer could issue stop sale, use, or removal orders. Under 13(b), the administer
may seize misbranded substances. Section 14(a) empowers the Administer to impose civil
fines. Section 25(a) gives the EPA the power to promulgate regulations relating to labeling
requirements. Lastly, § 14(b) imposes criminal liability on those found to distribute misbranded
substances. See Pub. L. No. 92-516, §§ 9(a), 13(b), 14(a), 14(b), 86 Stat. 973, 988-89, 99193 (1972).
36. Pub. L. No. 86-613, 74 Stat. 372 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-77 (1988)).
37. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, FEDERAL HAZARDOUS
SUBSTANCES LABELING ACT, H.R. REP. No. 1861, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960), reprinted in

1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2833, 2833.
38. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat 282 (1965)
(prior to 1969 amendment).
39. Sven Krogius, Comment, Dewey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.: A Welcome Exercise of
Restraint in Applying Preemption Doctrine to State Tort Actions, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 209,
215 (1991).
40. Id.
41. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970)
(codified as amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-39 (1988)); Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 112 S.
Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992).
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provisions. 4 2 Inevitably, questions arose as to whether these acts preempted
state common law tort claims predicated on inadequate warning labels. When
faced with the issue, different courts applying the general scheme of Federal
preemption reached different conclusions. Some courts found that the challenged provisions did not expressly preempt such claims, and held that an
implied preemption analysis was improper. 43 Other courts, while agreeing
that the preemption provision under review did not expressly preempt such
claims nevertheless went further to conduct an implied preemption analysis,
and determined that there was no occupation of the field and no actual conflict. 44 Other courts who also failed to find occupation succeeded in finding
an actual conflict with the Federal law.45 Still others found both occupation
of the field and actual conflict with federal law.4 6
42. FIFRA's preemption provision reads: "[A] State shall not impose or continue in effect
any requirements for labeling . . . in addition to or different from those required under this
[Act]." 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (1988). The FHSA's preemption provision reads: "no State...
may establish or continue in effect a cautionary labeling requirement ... unless such cautionary
labeling requirement is identical to the labeling requirement under section [1261(p)] or [1262(b)
of this Act]." 15 U.S.C. § 1261, note (1988) (Effect Upon Federal and State Law). The
Cigarette Act's preemption provision in effect from 1965 to 1969 read: "No statement relating
to smoking and health, other than the statements required by [this Act], shall be required on
any cigarette package." Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 5(b), 79 Stat. 282, 283 (1965). That provision
was amended to read: "No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be
imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this [Act]." 15 U.S.C. §
1334(b) (1988).
43. There is no more reliable indication of what Congress intended to preempt on a
given subject than what it expressly preempted in the statute. It is one thing for
the courts to try to divine congressional intent from the overall operation of a
statute and its legislative history when Congress has been silent, but it is quite
another to do so when Congress has included specific [preemption] provisions.
Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423 N.W.2d 691, 696 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), rev'd,
437 N.W.2d 655 (considering the Cigarette Act) (After the quoted passage, the court skipped
an implied preemption analysis).
44. See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 612-13 (1991) (holding
FIFRA does not occupy the field or conflict with state law); Chemical Specialties Mfrs.
Ass'n, Inc. v. Allenby, 958 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1992), (holding neither FIFRA nor the FHSA
occupies the field or conflicts with state law) cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 80 (1992); Dewey v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 577 A.2d 1239, 1248-50 (N.J. 1990) (holding the Cigarette Act
does not occupy the field or conflict with state law).
45. Worm v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 970 F.2d 1301, 1306-07 (4th Cir. 1992) ("FIFRA . . .
leaves substantial portions of the field vacant..." but "[i]f federal law mandates a specific
label and permits nothing additional or different, it can hardly be urged that a state tort duty
based on a warning requirement that is more elaborate and inconsistent with those labeling
requirements established by Congress in FIFRA or by the EPA in its regulations made pursuant
to congressional directive."); Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 659
(Minn. 1989) (holding jury verdict under state tort law actions will directly conflict with the
Cigarette Act's purposes).
46. See, e.g., Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1024-25 (11th Cir. 1991) ("We conclude
that FIFRA impliedly preempts state common law tort actions based on labeling in several
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C. Cipollone v. Liggett Group
In 1992, the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the issue of
whether the Cigarette Act preempted a state tort law failure to warn claim.47
The plaintiff, Rose Cipollone, brought suit against the manufacturer of the
cigarettes she claimed gave her lung cancer.4 8 The defendant alleged the
Cigarette Act preempted Mrs. Cipollone's failure to warn claim. 9 After a
lengthy yet thoughtful opinion, the District Court disagreed, holding that the
Cigarette Act did not preempt Mrs. Cipollone's claim.5 0 The Third Circuit
noting a split among the
Court of Appeals reversed." The Supreme Court,
2
jurisdictions on this point, granted certiorari.1
Justice Stevens began the plurality's opinion by disposing of a few preliminary matters. 3 First, he recounted the general scheme of Federal preemption.54 Second, the Court considered the question of whether it should
confine itself to an express preemption analysis since the Cigarette Act
contains an express preemption provision. 5 The Cipollone Court decided
that when (a) there is an express preemption provision, and (b) the provision
is a "reliable indicium of congressional intent to preempt State laws," 56 a
57
reviewing court does not need to resort to an implied preemption analysis.
Justice Stevens wrote: "Congress' enactment of a provision defining the
preemptive reach of the statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not
preempted. ' 58 Since both the 1965 and the 1969 preemption provisions
appeared to represent reliable indicia of Congressional intent to preempt
state law,59 the Court conducted only an express preemption analysis on the
ways. First ... we hold that the federal government has occupied the entire field of labeling
regulation .... [Second] we also hold that jury awards of damages in such tort actions would
result in direct conflict with federal law."); Lee v. Boyle-Midway Household Products, Inc.,
792 F. Supp. 1001, 1008-09 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (also considering the FHSA).
47. Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
48. Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1149 (D.N.J. 1984).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1171.
51. Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 183 (3d Cir. 1986).
52. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2613 nn. 2, 3 (1992).
53. Id. at 2617.
54. Id.
55. See supra note 42.
56. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618 (quoting Melone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497,
505 (1978)).
57. Id. at 2618 (citation omitted).
58. Id.
59. The Court did not come right out and declare the Cigarette Act constitutes a reliable
indicium of Congressional intent; it impliedly assumed so and restricted itself to the express
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60

two preemption provisions.
Beginning with the 1965 preemption provision, which prohibited the61
imposition of any "statement relating to smoking or health" under state law,
the Cipollone court drew two conclusions. First, the Court concluded that the
1965 provision only preempted "state... rule making bodies from mandating particular cautionary statements. ' 62 Second, the Court concluded that the
1965 provision did not expressly preempt state tort law failure to warn
claims. 63 Turning to the 1969 provision, which prohibited any "requirement
or prohibition" 64 imposed under state law that is different than those imposed
under the Act, 65 the Court opined that "[lt]he phrase '[n]o requirement or
prohibition' sweeps broadly and suggests no distinction between positive
enactments and common law; to the contrary, those words easily encompass
obligations that take the form of common law rules. ' 66 The court went on to
hold the 1969 preemption provision expressly preempted the plaintiff's failure to warn claims inasmuch as the claims required a showing that the labels
should have included "additional, or more clearly stated" 67 warnings than
68
those required by the Act.
The Cipollone decision precipitated an avalanche of scholarly com70
ment. 69 Since FIFRA and the FHSA contain similar preemption provisions,
courts on analyzing these statutes were quick to analogize to Cipollone. In
both the FIFRA and the FHSA contexts, the post-Cipollone decisions are
analysis. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2618 (1992).
60. Id.
61. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92 § 5(b), 79 Stat.
282, 283 (1965) ("No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statements
required by [this Act], shall be required on any cigarette package.").
62. Cipollone, 112 S.Ct. at 2619.
63. Id.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988) ("No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and
health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any
cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of [this Act].").
65. Id.
66. Cipollone, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2620 (1992).
67. Id. at 2621-22.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., Mary Pat Benz & Derek J. Meyer, Express Federal Preemption: Where is It
after Cipollone?, 59 DEF. COUNS. J. 491 (1992); Allan Kanner, Tort Law in the Regulatory
Age, 43 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 275 (1993); Recent Case, Preemption Doctrine
after Cipollone, 106 HARV. L. REV. 963 (1993); Kurt B. Chadwell, Comment, Automobile
Passive Restraint Claimy Post-Cipollone: An End to the Federal Preemption Defense, 46
BAYLOR L. REV. 141 (1994); R. David Allnutt, FIFRA Preemption of State Common Law
Claims After Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc., 68 WASH. L. REV. 859 (1993); Christopher J.
Gagin, Note, Cipollone v. Liggett Group: A Preemptive Lucky Strike?, 26 AKRON L. REV.
311 (1992).
70. See supra note 42.
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exemplified by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' opinions in Worm v.
American Cyanamid Company,7 and Moss v. Parks Corporation.2 In both
of these cases, the Fourth Circuit adopted the general rule of law from
Cipollone that plaintiffs' failure to warn claims that seek to impose more
elaborate or different labeling requirements upon the manufacturer than those
imposed under the Acts are expressly preempted by the preemption provisions
contained therein. 3 The court went on to hold that since there were no issues
as to whether the defendants' labels complied with the federal requirements,
the plaintiffs' claims must be viewed as seeking more elaborate or additional
74
warnings on those labels, and therefore preempted.
Just as the courts across the country began to issue opinions conforming
with the principles of preemption law the Supreme Court of the United States
set forth in Cipollone,71 the Supreme Court of Ohio appeared on the scene
issuing its opinion in Jenkins v. James B. Day & Company.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts
One day, Julette Jenkins decided to strip the paint from some of her old
furniture. 76 She bought a can of Dayco Marine-Strip, a chemical paint stripper produced by the defendant, James B. Day & Company 77 As the product's
71. 5 F.3d 744 (4th Cir. 1993).
72. 985 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2999 (1993).
73. Moss, 985 F.2d at 741 ("to the extent the Plaintiff seeks warnings that are more elaborate
or different from those issued by Congress and promulgated by the CPSC ... the Plaintiff's
claim is preempted [by the FHSA]"); Worm, 5 F.3d at 748 (holding the plaintiff's claims
were preempted by FIFRA to the extent they challenged the adequacy of the label found to
comply with the statutory and regulatory requirements).
74. Moss, 985 F.2d at 742; Worm, 5 F.3d at 749.
75. Other courts had adopted the rule of law articulated in Cipollone. See, e.g., Shaw v.
Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 371 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that because the preemption
provisions of FIFRA are analogous to the 1969 preemption provision of the Cigarette Act,
and because the U.S. Supreme Court held in Cipollone that a plaintiff's common law damage
actions cannot survive the 1969 provisions, the plaintiff's claims cannot survive under the
preemption provisions of FIFRA); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 985 F.2d 516, 518 (11th Cir. 1993)
("[FIFRA] preempts those of the [plaintiff's] state law claims which constitute 'requirements
for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from' the labeling and packaging
requirements imposed under [the Act]."); Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters
& Rogers, Inc., 981 F.2d 1177, 1179 (10th Cir. 1993) cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 60 (1993);
Salazar v. Whink Products Co., 881 P.2d 431, 433 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) ("The FHSA
preempt[s] common law failure to warn claims when the plaintiff seeks additional or more
clearly stated warnings than those required by the FHSA."); State ex rel. Jones Chemicals v.
Seier, 871 S.W.2d 611,614 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (FHSA).
76. Jenkins v. James B. Day & Co., 634 N.E.2d 998, 999 (Ohio 1994).
77. 1d. at 999-1000.
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active ingredient was methylene chloride,78 the paint stripper bore numerous
and lengthy warnings. 9 The relevant portions of the warnings concerned (1)
descriptions of the principle hazards of the product,8 0 and (2) precautions to
be followed to avoid injury." Ms. Jenkins ascended into her attic where the
furniture was being stored, cracked the sole attic window a mere two inches,
and began to apply the product.8 2 She was overcome by fumes, and subsequently died.83 The coroner reported that she had died of methylene chloride
poisoning. 8'
B. Proceedingsin the Lower Courts
Julette's father, Richard W. Jenkins, filed what was essentially a statutory products liability claim for failure to warn under Ohio Revised Code
section 2307.76 85 in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County. 6 The
defendant moved for summary judgment, alleging that the plaintiff's claim
78. Id. at 999.
79. The full label is reprinted in the opinion, id. at 1000. As this label takes up nearly three
pages, it will not be reproduced here beyond those portions in footnotes 80-81, which are
relevant to the discussion of the Ohio Supreme Court's reasoning. See infra part III. C.
80. On this point the label reads: "HARMFUL IF INHALED OR SWALLOWED... SKIN
AND EYE IRRITANT... Keep away from heat, sparks and flame .... Contact with flame or
hot surfaces may produce toxic gases.... Prolonged breathing of vapors in poorly ventilated
areas can be hazardous and even fatal to persons with heart disease." Jenkins, 634 N.E.2d at

1000.
81. On this point, the label reads:
Extinguish all flames, including pilot lights, and turn off stoves, ovens, heaters, electric
motors, and other sources of ignition during use and until all vapors (odors) are gone..
. Avoid prolonged breathing of vapor or contact with skin or eyes. To avoid breathing
vapors or spray mist, open windows and doors or use other means to ensure fresh air
entry during application and drying. If you experience eye watering, headaches, or
dizziness, increase fresh air, wear respiratory protection ... or leave the area. Do not
transfer contents to unlabeled bottles or other containers. Close container after each
use.... USE ONLY WITH ADEQUATE VENTILATION.

Id.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 999.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1000.
The statute provides that a product:
is defective due to inadequate warning or instruction at the time of marketing if,
when it left control of its manufacturer, both of the following applied: (a) The
manufacturer knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known about
the risk that is associated with the product and that allegedly caused harm for which
the claimant seeks to recover compensatory damages; [and] (b) the manufacturer
failed to provide the warning or instruction that a manufacturer exercising reasonable
care would have provided concerning that risk, in light of the likelihood that the
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was preempted by the FHSA.87 The trial court granted defendant's motion, 8
and the plaintiff appealed.8 9 The Court of Appeals for Franklin County reversed, holding that there were genuine issues of fact as to whether the warnings complied with the requirements of the FHSA. 9° The appeals court went
on to hold that even if the defendant's label met the FHSA's requirements as
a matter of law, the plaintiff's claim still would not be preempted. 9' The
defendant then appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court. 92
C. The Ohio Supreme Court's Opinion
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Alice Robie Resnick first
sketched an abbreviated version of the general law of federal preemption, 93
and admitted that "state tort claims can be within the preemptive reach of a
federal statute in the appropriate situation, despite the presumption against
preemption." 94 Next, the Ohio court cited Cipollone for the proposition that
when a federal statute has an express preemption clause, no implied preemption analysis is proper. 95 Thus, the court examined the text of the FHSA to see
if Congress intended to expressly extinguish Mr. Jenkins' state law claims. 96
As noted earlier, 97 the preemption provision in the FHSA reads in pertinent part that "no State or political subdivision of a State may establish
or continue in effect a cautionary labeling requirement ... unless such cau-

tionary labeling requirement is identical to the labeling requirement[s] under
[this Act]." 9' 8 The Ohio court followed the precedents set in Cipollone, Moss
9 9 and Worm v. American Cyanamid Company '0o and
v. Parks Corporation

product would cause harm of the type for which the claimant seeks to recover
compensatory damages and in light of the likely seriousness of that harm.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.76(A)(1) (Anderson 1991).
87. Jenkins, 634 N.E.2d at 1000.

88.
89.

Id.
Id.

90. Jenkins v. James B. Day & Co., No. 9lAP-1124, 1992 WL 63307, at *2 (Ohio App.
Mar. 24, 1992).

91.

Id. at *3.

92.

Jenkins, 634 N.E.2d at 1001.

93.

Id.

94. Id. (citing In Re Miamisburg Train Derailment Litigation, 626 N.E.2d 85, 91 (Ohio
1994)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 59 (1994).
95. Id.

96.

Id.

97.

See supra, part II. B. (discussing the case treatment of specific legislative acts).

98.
99.
100.

15 U.S.C. § 1261, (1988) (Effect upon Federal and State Law).
985 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2999 (1993).
5 F.3d 744 (4th Cir. 1993).
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held that Mr. Jenkins' claim would be preempted to the extent that it "attempts
to impose a responsibility on appellant to label Marine-Strip in a more elaborate or different manner than that imposed by the FHSA."'
The Ohio court next examined the list of requirements imposed under
section 1261(p) of the FHSA. 11 2 Section 126 1(p)(l)(E) requires "an affirmative statement of the principle hazard or hazards," and lists some examples,
such as "Flammable," "Combustible," "Vapor Harmful," "Causes Burns,"
"Absorbed Through Skin," or similar wording. 10 3 Section 1261(p)(1)(F)
requires a statement of "precautionary measures describing the action to be
followed or avoided." 104 Next, the Ohio court considered the plaintiff's claim
as essentially seeking to impose a requirement on the defendant to "provide
a warning label which was reasonably adequate under the circumstancesto

inform a user of the product of the risks involved, and the steps to be taken to
avoid those risks." 105
In comparing the requirements imposed under the federal law with those
sought to be imposed under state law, the court reasoned that because a manufacturer must write his own label, and because that label is not reviewed by
any federal agency for adequacy, 0 6 the section 1261(p) requirements must be
read to impose a duty on the manufacturer to draft a reasonably adequate
warning. 107 The court reasoned that since the plaintiff's claim also seeks to
impose a duty to provide a reasonably adequate warning under the circumstances, 0 the two are identical. 0 9 Because they are identical, opined the
court, the plaintiff's state tort claim does not seek to impose additional or
different requirements than those imposed by the FHSA, and therefore, the
10
claim is not preempted.
IV. ANALYSIS

The Ohio Supreme Court's new argument that the FHSA really imposes
upon defendants the same duty at common law to provide a reasonably adequate warning under the circumstances has the effect of preserving state tort
101.
102.
103.
104.

Jenkins v. James B. Day & Co., 634 N.E.2d 998, 1002-03 n.2 (Ohio 1994).
Id. at 1002.
15 U.S.C. § 1261(p)(1)(E) (1988).
15 U.S.C. § 1261(p)(1)(F) (1988).

105. Jenkins v. James B. Day & Co., 634 N.E.2d 998, 1003 (Ohio 1994)(emphasis added).
106. Id. at 1004. See also id. at n.4.
107. Id. at 1004.
108. Id. at 1003. See also supra note 86 for text of statute.
109. Jenkins, 634 N.E.2d at 1004.

110. Id.
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law systems in the face of federal legislation. By construing section 1261(p)
in this way, the court was able to avert preemption of section 2307.76 of the
Ohio Revised Code. This2 approach can be partially justified,"' but in the end
it must be condemned."
A. Supporting Rationale

There are a variety of reasons supporting the conclusion in Jenkins that
the FHSA does not preempt state tort claims upon which the Ohio court did
not rely. In the case Silkwood v. Kerr McGee Corporation,"3 the Supreme
Court of the United States held that a punitive damage award in a claim under state tort law was not preempted by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(AEA)." 4 The holding rested in part on the fact that without a cause of action
at common law, putative plaintiffs would be left without an adequate judicial
remedy. '55 Since the Silkwood decision, other courts have relied on this same
reasoning in holding other Federal acts do not preempt state tort law claims.' 16
Like the AEA, the FHSA does not provide an alternative cause of action for
those injured by hazardous substances.' '7 This lack of an alternative remedy
bolsters the holding in Jenkins.
In addition, there are several principles of statutory construction that
support the Ohio court's conclusion. First, statutes in derogation of common
law rights are to be strictly construed." 8 Second, for any change in the common law by statute, the legislative purpose to do so must be clearly and plainly
expressed." 9 Even after Cipollone, it may be argued that there is no clear,
111. See infra part IV. A (discussing supporting rationale).
112. See infra part IV. B (discussing the Ohio court's reasoning in light of the rules of
statutory construction relating to ascertaining and giving effect to the will of the legislative
body).
113. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
114. Id. at 258.
115. Id. at 251 ("It is difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove
all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.").
116. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 593 F. Supp 1146, 1154 (D.N.J. 1984) (considering the
Cigarette Act), rev'd, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986); Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 423
N.W.2d 691, 700 (Ct. App. Minn. 1988) (considering the Cigarette Act), rev'd, 437 N.W.2d
655 (Minn. 1989).
117. Sparks v. Metalcraft, Inc., 408 N.W.2d 347, 354 (Iowa 1987); Riegel Textile Corp. v.
Celanese Corp., 649 F.2d 894, 903 (2d Cir. 1981); Palmer v. Liggett Group, 635 F. Supp 392,
396 (D.Mass. 1984); Christenson v. St. Mary's Hosp., 835 F. Supp 498, 501 (D. Minn. 1993).
118. See generally, SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 61.01 (5th ed. 1992) (for
an discussion on strict construction of statutes); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2608, 2618 (1992) (holding that a court must construe preemption provisions narrowly in
light of the presumption against preemption of historic state police powers).
119. SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 61.01 (5th ed. 1992).
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plainly expressed Congressional intent to supersede state tort law claims in a
preemption provision like the one contained in the FHSA.12° This lack of any
clear manifestation of Congressional intent to preempt state law tort claims,
combined with the notion that federal acts inimical to state common law like
the FHSA should be narrowly construed, 2 ' supports the Ohio court's conclusion that the FHSA does not preempt those claims.
B. Higher Principlesof Statutory Construction
Notwithstanding the arguments submitted by the Ohio court and by other
courts, the Jenkins decision runs afoul of another accepted principle of statutory construction. It is well settled that in reviewing a statute, a court must
interpret it in such a way as to promote, not defeat, the purposes of the Legislature in enacting the statute in the first place. 122 This has been the rule in
Ohio since at least 1956, when the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that "the
primary duty of a court in construing a statute is to give effect to the intention
of the Legislature." 2' 3 This rule stems from the conception that the primary
duty of our judicial system is to discern and carry out the will of the legislative branch,124 and is said to be paramount over all other rules of statutory
120. Davidson v. Velsicol Chem. Corp. 834 P.2d 931, 934 (Nev. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1994 (1993). The Nevada Supreme Court held that even though FIFRA forbids states
from imposing different labeling requirements than those found in the Act, there was still no
express preemption of common law claims. Davidson was decided after the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Cipollone. As noted earlier, the Cipollone court held that the word
"requirements" in the preemption provision of the 1969 Cigarette Act expressly preempts
state common law claims. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. FIFRA also uses the
"requirements" language (as does the FHSA). See supra note 42. To support its position that
FIFRA's "requirements" language does not preempt Nevada common law claims, the Davidson
court relied upon a line of pre-Cipollonecases. Davidson, 834 P.2d at 934.
121. Cipollone 112 S.Ct. at 2618.
122. E.g,. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985) "The purpose of
Congress is the ultimate touchstone [of the meaning of the words in a statute]." Id. (quoting
Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn,, 375 U.S. 96 (1963)); Dickerson v.
New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 118 (1983) "As in all cases of statutory construction,
our task is to interpret the words of [the statute] in light of the purposes Congress sought to
serve." Id. (quoting Gonzalez v. Young, 441 U.S. 600, 603 (1979)); Shaw v. Delta Airlines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983) ("[O]ur task is to ascertain Congress' intent in enacting the
federal statute at issue."); N.Y. State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 41920 (1973); Crow Tribe of Indians v. United States, 657 F. Supp. 573, 590 (D. Mont. 1985),
rev'd, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987)); SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.05 at 22
(5th ed. 1992) ("An overwhelming majority of judicial opinions considering statutory issues
are written in the context of legislative intent.").
123. Humphrys v. Winous Co., 133 N.E.2d 780, 782-83 (Ohio 1956). Other Ohio cases
stating the rule include: Featzka v. Millcraft Paper Co., 405 N.E.2d 264, 266 (Ohio 1980);
Henry v. Central Nat. Bank, 242 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ohio 1968).
124. SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.05, at 22 (5th ed. 1992) (Separation of
powers principles obligate the judicial branch to construe statutes "so that they will carry out
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construction.' 25 Given these principles, it is difficult to understand why the
Jenkins court neglected to investigate the legislative purpose behind the
126
FHSA when it undertook to construe that act.
The purpose of a statute may be contained within a section of the statute
itself, 2 7 impliedly stated in its structure,2 8 or otherwise explained in its legislative history. 129 Unfortunately, the FHSA does not contain an express statement of purpose within the text itself. However, there is ample legislative
history useful in determining the purposes of the Act.
The FHSA was enacted in 1960 in response to what were at the time
modern developments in applied chemistry. 3 0 As those developments were
incorporated into household consumer products, more and more dangerous
chemicals entered the home. 3' The stated purpose of the FHSA has already
been mentioned briefly, 3 2 but bears repeating in greater detail. As revealed
in the 1960 report of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, "[t]he purpose of [the FHSA] is to provide nationally uniform requirements for adequate cautionary labeling of packages of hazardous substances
which are sold in interstate commerce and are intended or suitable for household use." "
The FHSA did not contain a preemption provision when it was
enacted. 3 4 Congress reconsidered and amended the Act in 1966 to remedy

the will, real or attributed, of the lawmaking branch of the government.").
125. Id. ("It has also been stated to show that all rules of statutory construction are
subservient to the one that legislative intent must prevail... ").
126. The Jenkins court only mentioned the purposes of Congress in enacting the FHSA in
passing, and only then because Justice Robie-Resnick quoted the Fourth Circuit's opinion in
Moss v. Parks Co. See Jenkins, 634 N.E.2d at 1001.
127. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992) (quoting James v. Rath
Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
128. Jones, 430 U.S. 519, 525 (citing City of Burbank v. Lockneed Air Terminal Inc., 411
U.S. 624, 633 (1973) for the proposition that Congress' intent to preempt state law may be
implicitly contained in the statute's structure).
129. E.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984) ("Where... resolution of a question
of federal law turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, we look first to the statutory
language and then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear [or nonexistent].").
130. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, FEDERAL HAZARDOUS
SUBSTANCES LABELING ACT, H.R. REP. No. 1861, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960), reprinted

in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2833, 2834.
131. Id.
132. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
133. H.R. REP. No. 1861, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960), reprinted in 1960 U.S.C.C.A.N.

2833, 2833.
134. Salazar v. Whink Products Co., 881 P.2d 431, 433 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).
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this defect.135 While amending the Act, Congress reiterated the fundamental
goal of the FHSA is to achieve nationally uniform labeling requirements, stating that "fi]t is impractical, unnecessary, and undesirable for each... product [covered by the Act] to be labeled specially for those States and cities
which have developed their own ... special forms of warnings over the years
during which there was no Federal law."' 36 The added preemption provision
was designed to relieve manufacturers and marketers of products entering
interstate commerce from the burdens of complying with fifty or more different schemes of labeling requirements.' 3 7 State and local governments were
"encouraged" "3and "permitted" 139 to establish identical requirements. 40 In
further comment, Congress explained that this preemption system was intended to strike a balance between "those who view Federal requirements as
merely minimum standards and those who would opt for uniform national
requirements." '"' To satisfy the former, the States were allowed to preserve
their own labeling requirements so long as they were identical to the Federal
requirements. 142
The Supreme Court of Ohio's construction of section 1261(p) of the
FHSA as imposing a requirement upon manufacturers to draft reasonably
adequate warnings under the circumstances of each particular case serves to
defeat Congress' goals of establishing a nationally uniform system of labeling requirements. A state law tort action for failure to warn is predicated on
a duty incumbent upon the manufacturer to provide a warning which
adequately informs the consumer of the dangers of the product. 43 When state
tort law claims are allowed to go forward, each individual jury would evaluate the label for its adequacy. 144 A damage award following a plaintiff's
135. Child Protection Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-756, 80 Stat. 1303 (1966).
136. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, CHILD PROTECTION ACT
OF 1966, H.R.REP. No. 2166, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N.

4095, 4097.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.

141. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, CONSUMER PRODUCTS SAFETY COMMISSION
IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1976, S. REP. No. 94-251, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in

1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 993, 1004.
142. Id.
143. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2620 (1992) ("common law damages
actions of the sort raised by petitioner are premised on the existence of a legal duty."). See
W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 99, at 695 (5th
ed. 1984) (A manufacturer will be held strictly liable for producing a product that is
unreasonably dangerous in that the label fails to adequately warn of a risk or hazard to the
consumer).
144. E.g., Forster v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 437 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Minn. 1989)("If
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verdict will impose a "requirement" under state law that the manufacturer
alter the label to avoid continuing liability. 4 ' As juries from different jurisdictions reach different conclusions as to whether the manufacturer's label
was reasonably adequate to warn of the unique danger which injured the plaintiff, the manufacturers will be forced to tailor its labels so as to provide the
warnings demanded by the various state tort law systems.

46

The resulting di-

vergence of labeling requirements across fifty different state law systems
obviously contravenes Congress' intent to establish nationally uniform label47
ing requirements in enacting the FHSA.
state claims are allowable, the jury on each state claim reevaluates the federal duty [to warn]
in terms of the state standards of adequacy and assesses tort damages against a manufacturer
found to be wanting.").
145. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2619 (1992) (holding common law
damage actions impose "requirement[s] or prohibition[s]" on the defendant); San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959); Worm v. Am. Cyanamid Co.,
970 F.2d 1301, 1307 (4th Cir. 1992) ("[A] jury verdict resulting from a ... manufacturer's
failure to warn of the dangers of the product has an effect no different from a legislatively
enacted state regulation requiring the insertion of a specific warning on the . ..label.");
Palmer v. Liggett Group Inc., 825 F.2d 620, 627 (1st Cir. 1987) ("If a manufacturer's warning
that complies with the [Cigarette] Act is found inadequate under a state tort theory, the damages
awarded and verdict rendered against it can be viewed as state regulation."); Salazar v.
Whink Products Co., 831 P.2d 431, 433-34 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) ("[A] state common law
duty to warn is nothing more than a duty to label a product to provide information. In that
sense, the common law duty is no less 'a requirement' in the preemption scheme than a state
statute imposing the same burden.").
146. See Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019, 1026 n.7 (11 th Cir. 1991) (If tort claims
were allowed, the defendant manufacturer would have to "change its methods of doing business
...to avoid the threat of ongoing liability."); Palmer v. Liggett Group Inc., 825 F.2d 620,
627-28 (1st Cir. 1987) ("Once a jury has found a label inadequate under state law, and the
manufacturer liable for damages for negligently employing it, it is unthinkable that any
manufacturer would not immediately take steps to minimize its exposure to continued liability.
The most obvious change it can take, of course, is to change its label [the plaintiff's verdict]
effectively compels the manufacturer to alter its warning to conform to different state law
requirements as 'promulgated' by a jury's findings."); See also Steven P. Croley & Jon D.
Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case For Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L.
REV. 683, 787 (1993) (Under traditional products liability scheme, manufacturers will alter
labels in response to tort liability); Mary Lee A. Howarth, Preemption and Punitive Damages:
The Conflict Continues Under FIFRA, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1301, 1324-25 (1988) (The net
effect of unconsolidated tort claims brought against a manufacturer in different states would
be to compel the manufacturer to use different labels in different states).
147, Palmer, 825 F.2d at 627 (State tort claims that challenge federal warning labels as
insufficient "- and the resulting confusion it would engender - surely contravenes the
[Cigarette] Act's policy of uniform labeling."); Lee v. Boyle-Midway Household Products
Co., 792 F. Supp. 1001, 1008 (W.D. Pa. 1992) ("A jury verdict or court decision ruling that
compliance with the labeling requirements of the FHSA does not provide a sufficient warning
under state law would frustrate the Congressional purpose of providing nationally uniform
requirements."); Forster, 437 N.W.2d at 659 (Minn. 1989) ("the state tort claim regulatory
scheme would directly conflict with one of the announced purposes of the [Cigarette] Act,
namely, to avoid 'diverse, nonuniform, and confusing' [labeling] regulations .. .and would
effectively dismantle the federal plan.").

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1995

17

Akron Law Review, Vol. 28 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 9

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:2

V. CONCLUSION

If the Jenkins court's interpretation that section 12 6 1(p) of the FHSA
imposes essentially the same requirements as under common law were
adopted by other states seeking to protect their state tort law systems, the net
effect would be to dismantle any remaining semblance of a nationally uniform
system of labeling requirements envisioned by Congress. The area of federal
preemption of state tort law existed in disarray before the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Cipollone. After Cipollone, courts reluctantly accepted
the Supreme Court's move toward federal preemption of state tort claims. The
new rationale proposed by the Supreme Court of Ohio has the potential to
cause new turmoil by reviving the state tort law systems that the federal
government is seeking to bring under control. Should this idea catch on with
other state courts, the erosion of federalism will be arrested. In the end, it will
be up to the Supreme Court to pass ultimate judgment upon this new
defense of State sovereignty.
RICHARD J. SCISLOWSKI

To be sure, the requirements imposed under the FHSA are not as "uniform" as those imposed
under the Cigarette Act. The 1969 version of the Cigarette Act requires a set of four short,
rotating messages to be reprinted verbatim on all cigarette packages sold in this country. See
15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1988). In contrast, the FHSA's requirements are not so exact. At best they
provide manufacturers with a series of examples, and leave it up to them to select one, or to
invent "similar wording." See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1261(p)(1)(E). However, just because absolute
uniformity can never be reached does not mean that a court sitting in review of the FHSA can
ignore this goal, nor does it mean that court should therefore interpret the statute in such a
way as to defeat all possibilities of achieving some semblance of uniformity. After all, the
legislative history on the purposes of the FHSA is clear. Evidently Congress believes it
better to allow manufacturers to design labels which cluster around the examples of the FHSA
than to continue to allow all 50 state tort systems to haphazardly fashion inconsistent schemes
of labeling requirements.
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